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How to provide, in only 10 minutes, a kind of insight into the conception of argument that I
have displayed in my book? This book has 500 pages and is the result of more than 25 years
of work with my research group in Hamburg. Therefore it is a delicate task to give a
substantive information about it in just some minutes. Despite this, I will start with something
outside that task: I will deeply thank my commentators to have studied my book and have
made up their minds about it. In particular I thank David Hitchcock who has initiated this
panel and even takes the pain to chair it now. To all of you I gladly confess that I very much
enjoy the opportunity to make our Hamburgian view a bit more understandable to the
argumentation scholars of North America.
I understand my task here like this: I am confronted with comments that have three
different backgrounds, namely Informal Logic, Rhetorical argumentation theory and
epistemic argumentation theory. In my answer after the fourth comment I will try to make the
differences between those and my view visible and show why I keep being convinced of my
own theories. As an entrance I will now very shortly deploy some of the specific concepts and
distinctions which are essential for our approach and I will do that in a way which should be
informative in particular for these three schools.
1. Aim of argument
The first crucial question of a theory of argument is: What is the aim, why do we care about
arguments at all? This question is crucial because depending on what the answer is, we will be
attentive to different things so that different aspects and different structures will appear
salient. My answer to the question is: Argumentation aims at the maintenance and improvement of orientation. Whenever an urgent gap in orientation shows up, we strive to fill it, and
if no knowledge is available, we have to look for some new orientation. Attempting reliable
new orientation, however, means to engage in argument.
I am aware that this answer is uncommon. It is, however, not an arbitrary one. On the
contrary I hold that it is the fundamental determination of the role of argument in human life.
Let me explain this:
Orientation is a basic need. It is part and presupposition of being active, of an
intentional pursuit of any other needs (starting from nourishment, shelter and mating). It is
this need that makes mankind strive for knowledge, viz. to advance from mere opinion to
knowledge. The medium of advancement is research and the theoretical layer of research is
argumentation (including, of course, knowledge but typically outrunning it).
The primordial character of this answer concerning the aim of arguing can be
estimated in comparison with other proposed specifications of the aim of argument. Informal
Logicians use to talk about “rational persuasion”. Yet this provokes the question: Why do you
want to rationally persuade someone? Very likely the answer would be something like: That
person would be better off if he/she took my thesis as an orientation. The Amsterdam group
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regards the overcoming of a disagreement as the aim of arguing. This can be a reasonable
issue only if there is a disagreement about the best available filling of an orientation gap and
arguing is meant to bring that about. Epistemic approaches determine argument as directed
towards an increase of the knowability of a conclusion. Here again this may be reasonable if
that better knowable conclusion delivers a reliable orientation.
(Certainly argumentation can be used for other purposes also, but as far as I can see,
these are, if not in the end aiming at reliable orientation, more or less arbitrary communication
games.)
One more hint: ‘Orientation’ is a term of pragmatist philosophy, i.e. a philosophy
which regards cognitive achievements as ultimately anchored in action. I have been blamed
for one-sidedness because argument also concerns pure cognitive and theoretical issues. This
is, however, a misunderstanding. “Orientation in action” refers not only to palpable activities,
but includes all kinds of live movements. In a sense we are always acting, also when we are
“doing nothing”, or when we contemplate. And insofar as the acting is to be self-determined,
we need “orientation”.
2. Material of argument
What does argument consist of? We have here answers like: propositions, speech acts, beliefs
etc. My answer is: “Theories”. Theories are symbolic representations of possible orientation.
They implicitly claim to fulfill this function and can fulfill it more or less. The word ‘theory’
in my use refers as well to everyday experiences, evidences, scientific hypotheses or complete
models, to established knowledge, but also to rules, norm-codices, plans, road maps, even to
speculations; in short: to any material that bears the implicit claim to function as orientation (a
counter example would be genuine poetry).
For the analysis of argumentation I have proposed a fundamental distinction within the
realm of theories. On the one hand there is theory which is already proven in its orientation
value and can therefore be used in premises viz. beginnings of justifications. On the other side
there is theory whose orientation value is only claimed so far. I call the first type “epistemic
theory” (or simpler: old theory) and the latter “thetic theory” (or: new theory). I am aware that
the word “epistemic” is rather established in argumentation theory (partly overlapping with
“epistemological”; my use of the expression can be affiliated with the established use but this
is not my concern here). Argumentation in general starts with construing thetic theory (a
thesis) and attempts at justifying it – which means connecting it as far as possible to epistemic
(old) theory. Thus, orientation, that is already available, is taken up and reflectively enhanced,
so that new orientation may be achieved.
3. Quality of argument
A justification of a thesis consists of several steps (starter steps and inferential steps), each of
which has to be scrutinized. Possibly there is an objection to be forwarded against a step
which has then to be parried and diffused (integrated into the justification or refuted). If a
thesis can be justified in a way so that no objection remains open, it is “valid”. (The word is
awkward, I know, but we found no better expression in English for “Gültigkeit” and in the
translation of Habermas’ works, they have also used “validity-claim”.) A valid thesis is
proved suitable as new orientation.
The question is now: Suitable for whom? Possible answers would be: for the
proponent, for both dialogue partners, for most or for all people, or for those who have some
concern about the issue. In my view the best answer is this: It is suitable for those who have
received through the argument an insight in how the orientation gap can be closed.
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Even though, there is a universalizing tendency in an argumentatively valid
conclusion. It is located in the intermediate realm between mere opinion (which is particular
and personal) and knowledge (which is universal and interpersonal). This universalizing
tendency, however, is not directed towards a more universal acceptance but toward meeting
and digesting more and more relevant objections. (This tendency is, in my book, grasped in
the very idea of the “Open Forum of Arguments”.)
4. Transsubjectivity
Argumentation is, in my view, intrinsically dialogical. This is, however, a special dialogue
structure. It is a corollary of the view that arguing is a reflective activity. In the thetic realm in
which it takes place I am concerned about construing new theory. Yet it has to be clear that
my constructions can be erroneous, even bluntly wrong. Therefore I have always to pay
attention if an objection may come into my mind which I had then to consider.
This layer of critical reflection in my own reasoning is the origin of the setting in
which argumentation is split into two roles, proponent and opponent (alternative wordings:
protagonist/antagonist, arguer/challenger etc.). As a reasoner I am my own opponent already.
But as I know about my proper limitations I am not satisfied with my own capacities to
consider objections. Thus, I care for a real interlocutor to take over the opponent role. The real
Other, however, may be suffused with prejudices and idiosyncrasies (equally to me, by the
way) and therefore the forwarded objections may be less relevant, so that I am tempted to
dismiss them. On the other hand I am definitely bound to reassure my thesis against
objections so that my possible insight gets a chance not to be illusionary. That is why I have
to take any objection of my opponent profoundly seriously. The Other is – in all her/his
limitations and errors – precisely as I myself – no less than a particular cognitive agent of the
reasonable project of humanity.
To argue in this consciousness is to practice argument under the “Principle of
Transsubjectivity”.
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